Dar minėtame video Милов paminėto "mąstymo siaurumo" kontekste prisiminiau vieną pavyzdį:Svetimas wrote: ↑2021-11-11 21:22Priminei man vieną Милов video kažkiek panašia tema. Galbūt jame ir yra slidžių ir netikslių apibendrinimų, interpretavimo kai kuriose vietose, bet, kiek pamenu, visai thought provoking buvo paklausyti jo požiūrį, asmeninę patirtį tuo klausimu: Как устроена психология чекиста?.
1983 Soviet nuclear false alarm incident, kurio metu vienas karininkas, nepaisydamas formalaus protokolo, praignoravo išankstinės perspėjimo sistemos aliarmą, kuris įvyko per 3 savaites nuo Korean Air Lines Flight 007 įvykio.
Taigi, gana logiška, kad jei didesnė dalis sprendimus priimančių žmonių Kremliuje yra galbūt kažkuo panašaus mąstymo ir iš tų pačių jėgos struktūrų, tai gali būti gana rimta problema.https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanislav_Petrov
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Petrov later indicated that the influences on his decision included that he had been told a US strike would be all-out, so five missiles seemed an illogical start;[2] that the launch detection system was new and, in his view, not yet wholly trustworthy; that the message passed through 30 layers of verification too quickly;[15] and that ground radar failed to pick up corroborative evidence, even after minutes of delay.[16] However, in a 2013 interview, Petrov said at the time he was never sure that the alarm was erroneous. He felt that his civilian training helped him make the right decision. He said that his colleagues were all professional soldiers with purely military training and, following instructions, would have reported a missile launch if they had been on his shift.[3]
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Rimtai. Be sarkazmo.
).. Įdomu, kiek sugriežtinta bus ta kontrolė šį kartą.